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ABSTRACT: This paper looks at major European twentieth-century narratives and interpretations that have seen it 
as an age of violence, terror and genocide. Using examples from historiographical debate and the analysis of specific 
historical processes (including the debates on genocide, concentrationary systems, civil wars and the Holocaust), it 
addresses both the characteristics of those narratives and some of their limitations and conceptual edges. Finally, the 
conceptual proposal put forward seeks to analyze, through historical contingency, continuities and discontinuities in 
the history of European collective violence.
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RESUMEN: Oscuro, sangrante y salvaje. La violencia europea del siglo xx y sus narrativas.- Este artículo propone 
una mirada a algunas de las grandes narrativas e interpretaciones sobre el siglo xx europeo que lo han visto como 
una centuria de violencia, terror y genocidio. A través de algunos ejemplos de debates historiográficos y de análisis 
de procesos históricos concretos (como los debates sobre el genocidio, los sistemas concentracionarios, las guerras 
civiles o el Holocausto), se abordan tanto las características de esas narrativas como algunos de sus límites y aristas. 
Al final, se adelanta una propuesta conceptual para analizar desde la contingencia histórica las continuidades y dis-
continuidades en la historia de la violencia colectiva europea.
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Dark, bloody and savage...2 It would appear that a de-
scription of the Old Continent, at least in the first half of 
the twentieth century, calls for adjectives that evoke 
blackness, chaos and death. They likewise apply –per-
haps even more so– when we consider, not the century as 
a whole, but some of the great events that occurred during 
that period, be they the First or Second World War, depor-
tations or forced displacements. They are certainly rele-
vant, when we look, not at the history of the whole conti-
nent, but at some of the countries or regions comprising 
it, from Civil-War Spain to Liberazione Italy, Nazi Ger-
many or Communist Rumania. In the twentieth century, a 
period of total war and mass annihilation for national, ra-
cial, identity or political reasons, states, para-states, 
groups and state agencies (or those who fought against 
them) caused millions of victims among war combatants 
and non-combatants in conflicts of a political, identity or 
racial nature. The civilian population, in other words the 
non-combatants, ultimately became –where they were not 
already– the priority target of groups which, either from 
their position of power, against the prevailing power or 
with a view to taking power, took up, launched or piloted 
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arms. Although it is obvious that the twentieth century 
cannot be interpreted exclusively in terms of violence and 
terror, it is hard to imagine any analysis of the last century 
without these variables. 
Historiographical literature on European violence 
contains enough common elements for us to contemplate 
the existence of a kind of great European transnational 
narrative –relatively recent but increasingly solid– on vi-
olence and its politics in twentieth-century Europe. This 
narrative is characterized by growing attention to the phe-
nomenon of terror, intimidation, expulsion and the ho-
mogenization of identity as processes that generated 
strong historical dynamics, where violence is not merely 
an epiphenomenon but even the very midwife of contem-
poraneity. It interprets the twentieth-century in terms of 
cleansing, expulsion and political, social and cultural 
elimination, where war and collective violence are no 
longer the result of a mere collapse of politics, inevitable 
and intrinsic human processes or trivialized interpreta-
tions pointing to insanity or criminality. It is, in short, a 
history of violence: the violence that drove the rise to 
power of fascism and antifascism, which was the main 
vehicle of political action under the mantle of civil and 
international wars, and which, from First World War mas-
sacres to the attempt at racial extermination in the Sec-
ond, made the twentieth the most brutal, bloody and, con-
sequently, foundational century in the history of the last 
millennium.
Indeed, more than a few historians consider it the 
most violent century in the history of humanity, both in 
terms of the human lives lost as a result of war and racial, 
political, ideological and identity conflicts, and for the 
centrality acquired by the discourse, accounts and praxes 
of violence in contemporary society (Lüdtke and Weis-
brod eds., 2006; Bloxham and Gerwarth, 2011; Capeloa 
Gil and Martins eds., 2012). The twentieth century was 
characterized by many and very complex phenomena, in-
cluding uprising, repression, revolution, ethnic conflict 
and genocide (Chenoweth and Lawrence eds., 2010: 6), 
but it was also defined by world and civil wars, with their 
interminable post-war periods, occupations, racial elimi-
nations and large-scale national displacements as well, of 
course, as identity cleansing (Ahonen et. al., 2008; Lowe, 
2012). All of these were processes of extreme violence 
against individuals and entire groups. From Asia to Amer-
ica, from Africa to Europe, the twentieth century was the 
century of democracy and science, but it was also the 
century of revolution and fascism. The century of vio-
lence, genocide and terror. 
It is certainly reasonable to think in these terms if we 
are referring to Europe. Violence, systematic elimination 
of the enemy, identification and separation of the other to 
protect the community were not, of course, the exclusive 
preserve of the twentieth century. The nineteenth century 
was a time of exiles and political deportations, of revolu-
tionary and counter-revolutionary prisons, and of national 
wars in which civilians played a substantial part. But the 
qualitative and quantitative scale of the violence of the 
preceding century is far outstripped by any of the pro-
cesses that took place in the twentieth. In general terms, it 
contained more violence than earlier centuries (pending 
developments in the current century, see foretaste in Hol-
mqvist, 2014), because the twentieth century had at its 
disposal better and more effective resources in contexts 
that were more conducive to inflicting it. In this article, I 
tackle, by way of incomplete panoptic (out of necessity, 
since the literature on these phenomena are too vast to be 
manageable), certain traits of these politics of violence 
through contemporary historiographical narration –con-
sciously focusing on the first half of the century– with an 
ultimate view to offering a conceptual proposal (although 
I shall seek to make this less pedantic than the phrase sug-
gests) which serves to analyze twentieth-century Europe-
an violence.
NARRATIVES
War and violence are some of the main mechanisms 
that define the history of twentieth-century Europe (Bald-
issara and Pezzino eds., 2004; Gribaudi ed., 2007). And 
within this history of violence, states, para-states and 
agencies of power are their main subjects, alongside para-
militarized groups endowed with openly violent and 
eliminationist political cultures. Political and identity mo-
tivations are their main justification. And the enemy 
–national, class, etc.– who usually non-combatants in the 
war processes, is its main objective. However, far from 
being coherent, linear or homogeneous, the histories wo-
ven by the narration of twentieth-century European vio-
lence, form a confusing mass of overlapping lines, where 
there is no blueprint or idées forces, a comparison of 
which must go beyond argumental juxtaposition, and for 
which simplistic explanations or aprioristic definitions 
will not suffice: massacre, genocide, politicide and holo-
caust have ultimately become, not the conclusion of com-
plex and protracted debate but, at times, conceptual apri-
orisms or mental boxes into which are introduced, and 
sometimes forced, a much more protean historical contin-
gency than tends to be acknowledged. 
The succession of internal and international wars 
which mark at least the first half of twentieth-century Eu-
ropean history, is perhaps the most studied period of con-
temporary historiography in recent decades, although its 
study has not always been accompanied by an analysis of 
the politics of violence implemented in European socie-
ties. The array of recent historiography on twentieth-cen-
tury European violence has, in general, drawn on common 
characteristics, both in terms of research methodology and 
to interpret the past. There are at least three such charac-
teristics. Firstly, there is general acceptance of a transna-
tional, and sometimes transtemporal, mechanism –not in-
frequently decontextualized– of the resolution of human 
conflict through violence. As pointed out by Dirk Moses, 
one of the top experts in the field, when I voiced my 
doubts about the concept’s applicability to the context of 
the Spanish Civil War, genocide is not a historical excep-
tion, but an almost constant feature throughout the history 
of humanity. Secondly, this mechanism –reduced to com-
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parable and repeated behavior in different times and plac-
es– is explained using a series of metaphors that take in 
the perpetrators, the identities of victims and the function-
ality of violence. And thirdly, the twentieth century is pe-
riodized around the watershed of 1945, leaving the second 
half of the century virtually free of collective violence, 
which is focused almost exclusively on the slightly more 
than thirty-year period between 1914 and 1945. The ques-
tion at stake here is not merely rhetorical, nor is it the fruit 
of a Byzantine debate: it is the observation that, in the 
study of violence as a historical subject in contemporary 
societies and of its usage, assumptions, metaphors, moral 
and political positions abound, but what is sometimes 
lacking is contextualization, a precise and complex knowl-
edge of the historical processes analyzed and non-aprioris-
tic theorization.
In reality, the current theoretical tools used to analyze 
processes like mass murder, genocide and civil war are no 
more than twenty years old. The changes that occurred in 
the management of political governance and territorial 
control after the end of the (so-called) Cold War, together 
with the globalization of economic resources, led to a 
necessary sophistication of the means used to analyze 
contemporary reality, also applicable to the field of col-
lective violence. And, understandably, this growing com-
plexity had, before long, extended to the field of historical 
analysis. This is apparent if we observe, for instance, the 
rapid growth in genocide studies since the nineteen-nine-
ties, although theoretical debate and exchange has been 
rich and intense since the end of the Second World War. 
Indeed, violence is a central theme in the promotion of 
conceptual exchange between political science, anthro-
pology, historiography and sociology. Political science 
was the first to tackle violence from the presumption of 
predictability, using, in most cases, the notion of political 
violence to refer to historical (and present) mechanisms 
of violence with a political nature, explanation and objec-
tive. Authors like Parsons (1964), Feierabend (1966), 
Gurr (1972), McFarlane (1974), Maffesoli (1979), 
Michaud (1980), Mommsen (1982) and, more recently, 
Della Porta (1995) have proved, in the theoretical field, 
the operation of processes like socialization through the 
symbolic dimension, deprivation or relative shortage, 
systematic frustration and dysfunctions in the system 
when analyzing what at that time was called violentology, 
namely the processes and mechanisms of violence for po-
litical motives or in political contexts. But this was al-
most always with reference to terrorism and virtually 
never to what historiography has dubbed mass killing, 
and it had one key objective: prevention.
This is a common topos in the analysis of collective 
violence, particularly when this comes from the social 
sciences. As such, it is the result of a strong decontextual-
ization of the elements of analysis – apparently a prereq-
uisite for assuming the predictability of the present and 
the future through a knowledge of the past. And this is 
particular relevant to certain historical narratives and 
analyses. Consequently, even where the contexts are not 
interchangeable, much scrutiny of the collective violence 
of the twentieth century has been unable to avoid the 
temptation to appeal to its usefulness, looking at the pre-
sent and towards the future because, to a great extent, its 
authors believe that identifying the elements that have led 
to violence in the past can avoid its repetition (as in 
Mann, 2005). To achieve this lofty goal, the world is di-
vided up into categories with a strong metaphorical and/
or purely conceptual component – the people, class, race 
or the Holocaust. Human action in society is reduced to 
tables, behavior charts, analytical diagrams and mathe-
matical formulae (such as Kalyvas, 2006), sometimes un-
anchored in contingency or even at its expense (Gold-
hagen, 2010:349 divides conflicts into tables, depending 
on whether or not the enemy was dehumanized or de-
monized). And there is tendency towards omni-compre-
hensive definitions or conceptualizations of complex and 
often distant processes. 
The best known, needless to say, is genocide, a term 
with enormous projection in recent historical studies and, 
indeed, one of the major macro-categories in the study of 
European violence (Stone, 2008; Moses ed., 2010; Moses, 
2013). As such, it links the definition of the crimes studied 
with a legal category endowed with imprescriptibility. It is 
therefore, at least partially, coherent with the demands 
made by memorialist movements in Europe (and on the 
American continent), but in historiographical terms, it is 
much more than a simple history from the victims’ stand-
point. Indeed, in recent times, alongside the array of theo-
ries in genocide studies, it has reached a degree of analyti-
cal complexity which amply transcends (as shown in the 
work by Bloxham and Moses eds., 2010), the aspects 
posed by the neologism’s creator, Raphael Lemkin.3 In 
short, the definition of genocide and its operativeness are 
open to debate, and for more reason than one. 
It is no less important that this array of theories should 
have been made on the basis of inclusive definitions, 
through which it is complicated –or, depending on your 
standpoint, extremely simple– to establish where or what 
a genocide is and where or what it is not. Although there 
are possibly no two theoreticians who coincide in every 
respect, in the most recognizable aspects of processes de-
scribed as such, genocide is said to be the result of bar-
baric, external, unexpected and extreme aggression on a 
particular category of innocent, defenceless victim which 
is a racial, religious or national population group, accord-
ing to the terms of the 1948 Convention; this has infinite-
ly more complex in recent studies, where this victim 
group is identified and stereotyped by another population 
group, namely the perpetrator (Shaw, 2007). The violence 
inflicted is said to have forms, causes and consequences 
which respond (or should respond) to a mechanistic, pre-
established and omni-comprehensive dynamic, to a glob-
al and recognizable plan to eliminate this category of vic-
tim. Consequently, in such processes, mass killing, 
elimination and forced displacement are considered ends 
in themselves: eliminating, possibly involuntarily, the re-
lational nature of mass killing, that element of violence 
which generates processes of terror and explains, among 
other things, political repression. 
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It is therefore a question of name, but also of interpre-
tation. And it carries with it a cosmovision of the past, its 
processes and subjects. If we accept general theories on 
political violence, terror and genocide, the first and great-
est perpetrator to be found in twentieth-century European 
violence is generally the state (Schmid, 1991; Horowitz, 
1989; Rummel, 1994), either in confrontation with other 
external states or in conflict with internal elements. How-
ever, the state form of power is not the only one. Im-
mersed in these processes, we also find para-states (such 
as those in civil wars), agencies peripheral to the state 
(like the Croatian Ustaše), potential or parallel states (like 
the Nazi SS), states in construction or reconstruction 
(such as those of post-war eras) or those who are fighting 
against the state, armed military groups (Italian or Yugo-
slav partisans, the Chetniks, the EAM-ELAS or FTP) or 
terrorists (the squadristi, the Brigate Rosse, the IRA, 
ETA). And of course, we find not only leaders, but also 
local and territorial agencies of power whose criteria do 
not always coincide with that of the state (Kershaw, 2005; 
Chenoweth and Lawrence eds., 2010). We will find col-
lective stakeholders who, in the slippery terrain of col-
laboration, may be both victim and executioner, and we 
also find individual stakeholders (Jensen and Szejnmann 
eds., 2008) with their own non-transferable criteria. Fi-
nally, we will find criteria that do not strictly operate at 
the state level. The nature of National Socialist, fascist or 
revolutionary political and racial violence, for instance, is 
not defined only by state interests, but, above all, by the 
construction and protection of communities of people and 
nations, of racial, national or class homogenization under 
the auspices of violence and its use. In the context of civil 
war, the interaction of multi-directional violence sits un-
easily with the theoretical patterns of unexpected aggres-
sion among identity macro-categories.
There are, then, highly significant nuances to the con-
clusion that leads the state and its criteria to be, respec-
tively, the sole perpetrator and legitimizer of collective 
violence. Indeed, there is no ideal combination of factors. 
There is no single, transtemporal and decontextualized 
violence; no violent, monocausal ideal type. The most 
widespread kind of analysis in genocide studies, focused 
on the search for ideological, racial, religious or construc-
tion factors of state entities, which compares a process of 
violence with a genocide ideal type, tends to have diffi-
culty when used in empirically-based analysis. Through 
geopolitical, identity or cultural analysis, the seizure of 
power or its maintenance may ultimately emerge as mi-
nor variables when attempting to understand mass vio-
lence. Historical contingency reveals fewer structural 
than contextual factors in a comparative study of these 
processes. Indeed, it is not that the ideal combination of 
state-intentionality-planning –which, added to the neces-
sary condition of defined victim, is established as a pre-
requisite for the 1948 Convention definition of genocide 
(the definition mainly used in Spain owing to lack of 
awareness of the work by authors like Bloxham, 2008)– 
does not appear beneath the surface of reality. But it is 
rather that, as if caked in apriorism, this ideal combina-
tion surrounds knowledge of the past. Perhaps, more than 
homicidal intentionality, we ought to refer to amorphous 
processes, devoid of blueprint or idées forces. Conse-
quently it is debatable whether we can use the same de-
nomination, namely genocide, for different processes in 
distant contexts.
Put another way: there is less evidence suggesting imi-
tative effects between different power systems than that 
which points to the feasibility of understanding each phe-
nomenon of violence in its own context. Analysis of their 
respective criteria reveals a greater importance of local 
and regional dynamics than the application of a suprana-
tional logic, however many common elements they may 
share in terms of interests of class, identification and ste-
reotyping of the enemy and in the application of violent 
political purging and cleansing mechanisms. The materi-
alization of power in forms of violence is usually related 
to contexts of war or acute internal tension. Also, the pro-
gressive conceptualization of civilians as a priority war 
target, and the blithe and unthinking dissemination of ide-
ologies exalting violence and death are certainly among 
the dynamics that did most to promote that. The factors of 
modernization and accumulation resulting from industri-
alization, and, in general the economic structure (rural 
and/or urban) are, when seen in perspective, key to its 
practical materialization: undoubtedly in the few phenom-
ena of revolutionary violence in Europe, but also in the 
identification of certain social categories as dispensable 
(the European Jews, as a case in point). But, as rightly 
pointed out by Christian Gerlach (2010: 1-9), all this prep-
aration, all this accumulation of determining factors need 
not necessarily lead to a process of collective violence. 
There are, of course, common dynamics. More precise-
ly, such processes mainly take place in contexts defined by 
severe conflict praxes and crisis perception (Gerlach, 2010: 
267). Moreover, if we consider twentieth-century Europe, 
they also take place, on the whole, over periods of time that 
are not excessively long. There are, of course, long periods 
of political repression, of structural subjugation to the real-
ity, or potential threat, of violence, and the cases of Spain 
and Portugal are good examples. But if we take a closer 
look, we will see how collective violence tends to take 
place at specific moments, rather than over indefinite peri-
ods of time. It has precipitation processes in times of crisis, 
and in Europe the periods of all-out war undoubtedly stand 
out as being such, and they ultimately have a broad factual, 
rather than potential, range (killings, deportations and 
forced exile). Indeed, collective violence cannot be reduced 
to the condition –albeit most relevant, but also most 
extreme– of killing. In their role as a part of broader trans-
formation projects, processes of collective violence –inter-
related to varying extents– could be implemented to differ-
ent degrees, ranging from unfair discomfort to collective 
extermination, and including repression, selective terror 
and mass terror. 
Though not infinite, the repertoires in question are di-
verse, numerous and even imaginative. They cover not 
only killing and abuse, which is sometimes extreme: vio-
lence (the action) and terror (the effect) do not always end 
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in death or even have death as their aim: mass violence is 
not just extermination, but involves a much broader con-
cept than mass killing (Thrift, 2006). Were we to leave 
out of the actions we understand as mass violence, all 
those that are not accompanied by death, either by action 
or by omission, we would not include exile, deportation, 
torture, political repression, forced imprisonment, perse-
cution, beating, forced impoverishment, rape or many 
others. Yet the Squadistra violence of early Fascism, us-
ing castor oil and the Fasci campaigns in Northern Italy, 
was less murderous than intimidatory. Internment in the 
savage camps of the Nazi Germany of 1933, or the Span-
ish and Portuguese work camps did not pursue the death 
of their prisoners. Nor was this the aim of the rape and 
public humiliation of left-wing women in the Spanish 
Civil War, or of the collaborators during the liberation of 
France. Many of the half a million Spanish people exiled 
also died, but they were not killed. Thousands of the up to 
12 million Germans who were expelled or deported from 
Eastern Europe after 1945 also died. The exiles and de-
portations meant mass displacements of individuals char-
acterized by a precise national, political and, to a great 
extent, ethnic-linguistic identity. The death of the dis-
placed persons was not deliberately sought. And yet, we 
would be hard-pressed to leave this deportation, rape, hu-
miliation, internment and exile out of the analysis of what 
violent praxis in the twentieth century is and represents. 
Indeed, scholars studying the nineteenth century –when 
there were civil and international wars, political reprisals 
and imprisonments, but no extermination camps or atom-
ic bombs– would, to say the least, find such an approach 
grotesque.
Europe (central, western, eastern, southern and north-
ern) is the laboratory where violent progression and the 
dynamics of contemporary destruction become more ap-
parent, as it is the ground on which –unlike the United 
States of America, whose interventions on foreign soil 
give rise to reflections along lines of cultural continuity, 
as in Dower (2010), Black (2012) or Atanasoski (2013)– 
most wars took place, and did so on a more continuous 
basis, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Without 
war, rates of violence are always considerably lower. The 
killing of the Armenian national minority in Turkey re-
quired no war context in 1894-96 or in 1909, but the way 
in which it took place (identification of the national mi-
nority as the enemy and the ally of Turkish enemies, de-
portation and mass death) required the legal and function-
al context of the global war (Dadrian, 1995; Melson, 
1992; Akçam, 2004; Kévorkian, 2006). In Spain, the rate 
of killings as a result of political persecution, and other 
indicators of collective violence, such as concentration-
ary systems and forced labor, dropped substantially in 
1948, after the end of the state of war initiated in 1936. 
Throughout the protracted age of Fascism, the greatest 
violence, in quantitative terms on Italian soil, took place 
in the context of the Second World War, and of the Civil 
War and Liberazione. Indeed, Italy is a clear example of 
these radicalization mechanisms. Violence in Mussolini’s 
Italy was not limited to the millions of accusations or the 
hundreds of thousands of arrests that took place in peace-
time, but also included a diverse range of violence of a 
political, colonial and racial nature.4 However, despite the 
clear and explicit evocation of permanent violence, its 
policy of violence was quite substantial, and quite on a 
par with those of its neighbors, especially in times of war: 
the period of military internment, anti-Slav policies in the 
Balkan region under military occupation and the Jewish 
deportation. Europe’s major collective massacres have, 
then, taken place under the auspices, or as a result, of war 
processes, and in these contexts, non-combatants have 
been their main objectives. It is true that, when seen in a 
global perspective, genocide and mass killing are not and 
need not always be related to the war contexts them-
selves. The Ukrainian Holodomor 1933 (Naimark, 2010) 
or the massacres in Maoist China, including hundreds of 
thousands of Tibetans in 1950, were not directly related 
to a military confrontation. However, if we turn the spot-
light on Europe, we will reach a different conclusion.
CONTINGENCIES
When considering mass violence in twentieth-century 
Europe, it is crucial, as Mark Mazower (2002) recalls in an 
influential article, to make historical contingency our start-
ing point. This does not mean foregoing theorization. Quite 
the contrary, historical contingency must serve –unlike in 
the works of authors such as Midlarsky (2005), Slim 
(2008) or Valentino (2004)– to modulate, complete and en-
rich it. Theorization requires a painstaking prior recon-
struction, an informed study of contextualization and a so-
phisticated attempt at comparison. Rather than a conceptu-
alization of violence as a decontextualized mechanism 
suspended in time and space, historiography must offer an 
analytical framework that does not set aside spatial, tempo-
ral or contextual dimensions. Pace of development, asym-
metry and spatial differences cannot be underestimated. 
Nor can we reduce mass violence to pathological mecha-
nisms or forget that it can be a mechanism or an end, it can 
be a tool or have a nature of its own, but it always has a 
purpose and objectives. It must, in short be contained. And 
if, instead of gazing through the looking glass of empirical 
demonstration of a previously-developed theory, we con-
template the contemporary past of violence through histor-
ical contingency (clearly historiography’s most relevant 
contribution in this field), we will observe that the twenti-
eth century was extremely violent, owing to the global ac-
cumulation of multifactorial historical processes, each in 
its own set of circumstances and context, which were not 
necessarily exclusively national or endogenous but were, 
in short, its own.
A combined analysis of collective violence in twenti-
eth-century Europe, which I only refer to here as an inter-
pretative proposal, must be considered in a series of dif-
ferent lights. The first is to assume the impossibility of 
covering all the different, complex and multi-layered pro-
cesses of violence on the Old Continent. The second is to 
heed historical contingency before theoretical develop-
ment in order to be able to observe the dynamics of conti-
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nuity and discontinuity in the circumstances that promot-
ed this multiplication of violence praxes. The third is to 
observe how rates of violence in Europe rose exponen-
tially as a result of the concurrence on its soil of the phe-
nomena of fascism (Kallis, 2005), war of occupation and 
civil war (Rodrigo, 2014), with this multiplication of con-
flicts contributing, in turn, to the multiplication of the in-
tensity and depth of the politics of violence in Europe im-
plemented against a stereotyped, supra individual enemy 
which was, moreover, in most cases a non-combatant ci-
vilian. And the fourth is not to bring explanation to a halt 
with the cessation of hostilities in 1945, avoiding that 
clear-cut division which often prevents us from noticing 
that the end of the violence after Second World War was 
not an occurrence but a process, into which rupture and 
continuity were interwoven, and in which the criteria of 
violence were gradually or abruptly replaced in the sec-
ond half of the Forties. 
Even so, the very notion of the twentieth century is not 
totally clear cut, at least where this issue is concerned, and 
particularly, if we analyze the origins, in chronological 
terms, of the rise in violence defined in the contemporary 
way (in wars, against civilians, motivated by power and 
identification of the enemy on racial, economic, political 
or identity grounds). Continuing a tradition started by 
Hannah Arendt (1974), war and cultural elements have 
been identified that enable us to find the roots, background 
and even origins for particular types of violent behavior 
by the state (including the annihilation and political purge 
campaigns orchestrated by the rearguard during the Span-
ish Civil War) in colonial practices (Morton, 2013). Mass 
deaths like those in the Java War of 1825-30 (some 
200,000 villagers killed by the Dutch army), those in Al-
geria in 1840, the decimation of the indigenous population 
of California from 85,000 to 35,000 people between 1852 
and 1860, the death of more than 100,000 indigenous peo-
ple in Mozambique at the hands of the Portuguese army in 
its conquest of the island’s interior at the turn of the cen-
tury, or the almost 11,000 Sudanese warriors killed by the 
British army’s machine gun fire in 1898, are interpreted, 
wholly or partially as genocide, perhaps stretching the us-
age of this complex category, traversed by historical, le-
gal, sociological, anthropological and moral assumptions, 
the disproportionate use of which sometimes responds 
more to the import of conclusions than to the debate about 
this usage. One case, however, is particularly striking, 
namely the extermination by German troops of the Herero 
people in South-West Africa between 1904 and 1906 (Sar-
kin, 2011). Since 1884, the indigenous Herero people in 
Namibia had been subjected to confinement, to the occu-
pation of their lands, to segregation and eradication of 
their basic rights. The failed uprising against German 
farmers of 1904 is said to have triggered the measures tak-
en by the troops led by Von Schlieffen to deport to the de-
sert a population that was already decimated and which, in 
the course of the process would be reduced from 80,000 to 
16,000 people. The identification of the eliminated popu-
lation, the constant and cumulative nature of the segrega-
tion, exclusion and expulsion policies and, ultimately, the 
mass character of the elimination practices suggest this to 
be the first contemporary genocide and, possibly, the only 
one that can reasonably be defined as such in the colonial 
context. Colonialism in Africa and Oceania was terrible 
for the vast majority of the colonized populations, imply-
ing violent pacification rather than peace, as well as labor 
exploitation (essentially in agriculture and on the rail-
ways) and the large-scale propagation of disease. But, ex-
cept in the case of the Herero extermination, to refer to 
these cases as genocide (as in Stannard, 1992) is to reinter-
pret and redefine the term to such a degree as to render it 
virtually inoperative.
More than genocide, the main thrust of contempora-
neity would be collective violence, essentially developed 
in times of war and, within it, against non-combatants. In 
this sense, historiographers are virtually unanimous in 
placing the origin of the era of contemporary terror in the 
Great War. The 1914-18 War was a war of generalized 
and definitive violation of nineteenth-century war rules 
and principles, with the bombarding of civilians, econom-
ic blockades, territorial occupation and forced labor of 
non-combatants. It therefore reached dimensions previ-
ously unknown on the scale of contemporary violence.5 
The Great War entailed a new, highly lethal and acutely 
dehumanized form of armed combat. But within it, it also 
contained overlapping conflict processes and violence be-
tween which the interconnections are not always made. 
The aspect of the War’s numbers, however, remains a 
slippery slope, as too is any attempt to distinguish be-
tween combatants and non-combatants in all-out war. 
And if to that we add the fact that warfare technology was 
infinitely superior to information and knowledge technol-
ogy (in short, it was easier to kill enemies than get to 
know them), we come up against the obvious difficulties 
involved in working out real and effective casualties, di-
vided and separated by categories (both real and analyti-
cal), which are nonetheless crucial to gauge the signifi-
cance and impact of the Great War. The accepted global 
figures stand at around nine to ten million dead soldiers 
(of the 70 million mobilized) and 25 million injured. Eve-
ry day, 1,300 Germans and 900 French died. But exactly 
what proportion were combatants and civilians? For 
Mann (2005), the proportion of civilians who died in the 
Great War did not exceed the 10% proposed by Chester-
mans (2001). Mc Millan (2011: 46) believes it to be 5%, 
compared to 66% in the Second World War. And all of 
these figures contrast with the 30% proposed by Alan 
Kramer (2007; with Horne, 2001), currently the major ex-
pert in everything connected with prisoners of war, the 
deportations of civilians, concentrationary systems and 
forced labor in the Great War. His seminal work has high-
lighted the way in which the repertoires of violence in the 
Great War went beyond what can strictly be considered 
war and did not only consist of the killing of soldiers and 
military personnel. Indeed, a central element in recent 
studies is the extension of the repertoires of what should 
be considered practices of violence in the context of oc-
cupation policies, as inflicted both on soldiers and on the 
civilian population (McPhail, 1999; Procacci, 1999). 
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The processes of internal violence which the Great 
War fostered and helped create (deportation, ethnic-na-
tional homogenization or internal wars) would also ele-
vate indices and figures to hitherto unknown heights. A 
good example of the significance acquired by these reper-
toires of violence was in the rise of internment and con-
centration camps of prisoners and civilians. From the 
early weeks of occupation, faced with the shortage of 
manpower, civilians were the parties most affected by the 
deployment, firstly of forced labor, and later of camps 
where they would be interned (Becker, 2007). Thus it was 
that the Great War came to maximize both the functional-
ist use of concentration camps as a war-administrative 
unit, and their perception as a cheap and plausible, pre-
ventative and arbitrary, anomic and adaptable means of 
meeting the needs created by the massive numbers of war 
or political prisoners in the hands of state or para-state 
units, of converting internees into exploited agents. The 
violentization of political practices and the massive na-
ture of the political divisions resulting from or as a conse-
quence of the six-year period from 1917-22, would do the 
rest to establish the premises of the new type of camps 
–the ultimate expression of political violence, imposition 
of the divider and suffering for political, social and ideo-
logical causes.
Yet it is remarkable how processes of such magnitude 
as the revolution in Russia, the Civil War in Finland or 
the elimination of the Armenian minority in Anatolia are 
so often taken out of their war context. During the First 
World War, Armenians, Greeks, Assyrians, Chaldean 
Christians and Kurds in the Ottoman Empire died in pro-
cesses of forced resettlement and massacres of different 
kinds. Indeed, in recent years, quite a few scholars have 
wondered about the relevance of analysis focused on con-
tinuities, learnings from military praxes or the generation 
in a colonial context of practices of unlimited collective 
violence (Dwyer and Ryan eds., 2012). No fewer have 
pondered the historical caesura and pedagogy of extreme 
violence which the First World War meant for Europe, a 
conflict on an unknown scale which turned violence into 
a fulcrum of the contemporary European age: a factor in 
national construction, community identification and so-
cial purification, as well as a mechanism for action on the 
issue of minorities. 
The Great War was a fundamental tipping point in the 
configuration of ethnic-national identities and in the crea-
tion of a new framework, that of all-out war, propitious 
for their resolution (Roschwald, 2001; Núñez Seixas, 
2001; Sanborn, 2005: 290-324). The genocide of Tur-
key’s Armenian population, the first in what Hobsbawm 
called the short twentieth century, (with the levy of iden-
tification taxes, forced displacement, confinement and 
killing) points precisely in this direction, the same direc-
tion as the civil wars that broke out in Russia and Finland 
in the heat of the World War, conflicts that arose in the 
context of total international war, invasion and rearguard 
purges. The war that continued until 1923 between White 
and Bolshevik Russians, counter-revolutionaries and rev-
olutionaries on the basis of the criteria generated in 1917 
(Payne, 2011), made it necessary to design the seizure 
and maintenance of revolutionary power in an armed con-
text, putting to the test the space which both contenders 
reserved for political purges, cleansing, repression and 
the exploitation and/or elimination of the adversary (Fig-
es, 2000: 690; Swain, 1996; Brovkin, 1994; Mayer, 2001; 
Mawdsley, 1987). This war is of key significance when 
constructing a cosmovision of twentieth-century Europe 
focused on the politics of violence implemented in its 
states: the Russian Civil War was the context which gave 
rise to the Red Terror and to institutions like the Cheka 
and the Gulag. 
A good example of its paradigmatic character and its 
scope in the field of contemporary narration on European 
violence can be found, in fact, in the Soviet concentration 
camps, which arose out of the experience of the Russian 
Civil War and in the context of totalization of war in the 
Great War, which swiftly shifted towards a predominantly 
political and social use, and whose raison d’être lay in 
forced labor, especially after Stalin’s rise to power and 
the implementation of his economic plans, which envis-
aged massive use of prisoners, “asocial” persons and dis-
sidents for labor. This is not a short-sighted or schematiz-
ing conceptual homogenization, nor does it have anything 
to do with the reductionist description according to which 
the Gulag is supposed to be the fons et origo of Aus-
chwitz. In a theoretical model, the inter-relationship be-
tween both phenomena can work, because the Soviet 
camps preceded their fascist counterparts chronological-
ly, were born of all-out war, revolved around punitive 
forced labor and served as the space for political repres-
sion. There is therefore a reasonable and legitimate doubt 
which should not be attributed only to an attempt to rela-
tivize the phenomenon of the German Lager or to ideo-
logical exaggeration. Precisely for this reason, they need 
to be studied in depth, to distinguish them better and, in 
this way, identify more clearly the fascist pattern of the 
European camps. The Soviet camps were established in a 
society and under political, social and identity premises 
that were radically different from those in the Europe that 
gave rise to fascism. They were, under no circumstances, 
centers for the extermination of civilians: the death of ap-
proximately three million of them on the Gulag archipela-
go, out of the 18 million who passed through it (Bacon, 
1994; Applebaum, 2004; Davies and Wheatcroft, 2004), 
indicates that forced labor, albeit in extreme conditions, 
was not a systematic, supra individual and preventative 
practice of extermination. Compared to other overtly ex-
terminatory Stalinist policies (the dekulakization or star-
vation in Ukraine in particular), the Gulag was not an 
eliminationist space however brutally re-educative it may 
have been.
The fact that genocide was practiced in the USSR or 
that it was a society that was violent in the extreme, as 
indicated by Gelarch (2010), does not mean that either its 
political or ideological ethos was similar to that of the Eu-
ropean fascists, or that its re-educative, homicidal tactics 
were comparable. In many cases, the harshness of Soviet 
labor exploitation far exceeded that of the fascist camps. 
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What the chronological and interpretative similarities es-
sentially tell us, is about the versatility of concentration-
ary spaces. And a comparative study of these, and of the 
eliminationist practices of the different societies, will also 
define big enough differences for us not to assume direct 
continuities, even in a strictly theoretical framework. The 
Gulag operated more and better in peacetime than at war, 
and it was a mechanism that ran parallel to that of the po-
litical, social and national repression of the republics that 
made up the USSR. Nonetheless, it did reproduce the his-
torical ruptures regarding internment and forced labor to 
which the Great War gave rise. Indeed it might be said 
that they became its paradigm, and even its enormous dis-
torting mirror.
In fact, global wars tend to contain processes of inter-
nal facture within, as is apparent if we analyze the Second 
World War and, to a lesser extent, the First. Yet World 
War I marked the birth of the European civil-war era be-
tween 1918 and 1947 and, likewise, of some of the ele-
ments that help explain its virulence, essentially the mac-
ro-categories of revolution and counter-revolution.6 In 
both cases, the figures relating to the politics of violence, 
cleansing and purging serve not only to demonstrate the 
difficulties of distinguishing between death and killing, 
and between civilians who were executed or died as a re-
sult of war conditions, but also to confirm that the context 
of the Great War in which both took place, contributed 
greatly to the “why” (defined by two dimensions: frag-
mentation and sovereignty), to the “who” (local and su-
pralocal stakeholders, civilians and armies, as in González 
Calleja, 2013: 138) and to the “how” (internments, occu-
pation policies, forced labor, civilian killings) of the inter-
nal violence. In general historiographical terms, it would 
seem obvious that the massive nature of the crimes of 
both the First and Second World War brings the historians 
of 1914 to a new dimension: aware that the notion of the 
contemporaneity was born in the Great War, they see 
themselves driven to project on to the past ethical-inter-
pretative categories through which a large part of histori-
ography has reread the recent past. The resulting impres-
sion is that analysis, when done from front to back, taking 
for granted and as recognized the birth of the fascist, 
eliminationist alternative in Europe, bestows much more 
importance on the results of the war than on the war it-
self. It consequently leaves the war, if not entirely void of 
content, at least reduced to a merely necessary condition, 
an entry point for the interwar opening: for the Auschwitz 
era. It does so, however, not without difficulty.
Indeed, one of the great debates around contemporary 
violence revolves around its representation and the limits 
of that representation. Whereas the central topos of the 
political science debate is prevention, the cultural studies 
debate considers representation. Historiography, in the 
meantime, has occupied a contentious space in this field 
as well, since, until recently, the issue of violence was in-
terpreted and considered through the subject areas of an-
thropology and philosophy, but very little was recon-
structed in historical terms. A number of examples, 
including Katz (1994), Millen (1996), Wiedmer (1999), 
Smith (ed.) (2002), Clifton Spargo and Ehrenreich (eds.) 
(2010), Jacobs (2010) or Aleksandrowicz-Pedich and Pa-
kier (eds.) (2012), to name a few, underscore the symbol-
ic significance of a process, namely the process of depor-
tation to death camps between 1942 and 1945 (indeed 
much less importance has been attributed to in situ kill-
ings by Einsatzgruppen between 1939 and 1942) in the 
configuration of a transnational memory that is not with-
out its shadows and which is often constructed without 
taking history into account (a subject, tackled in its full 
complexity in Stone (2012). The historiographical tradi-
tion focused on the machinery of extermination, plunder 
and the predatory behavior which Nazi territorial occupa-
tion policies entailed and, after 1942, the direct death 
centers that fell under the scope of what was known as 
Aktion Reinhard, is one of the richest and most complex 
in Europe, the USA, South America or Israel. But as such, 
it has been the source of some of the most intense de-
bates, in relation not only to the progress made in general, 
regional and local research on the extermination of Jews, 
Slavs and other minorities, but also in connection with 
extrascientífic processes and events. Discussions such as 
those on intentionality, comparability, contextualization 
in the most extensive political and social project of fas-
cism, or its Jewish specificity and uniqueness –an aspect 
upheld by an ever decreasing number of scholars, such as 
Weiss-Wendt, 2008: 43)– have fuelled, and continue to 
fuel, some of the major debates on the contemporary era 
in philosophical, legal, sociological and anthropological 
fields, to name a few. 
In recent years, the trend has been, on the whole, to 
decouple the extermination from its uniqueness and place 
it in direct relationship with the ideological and political 
framework of German fascism – thus we find, as Tim Ma-
son anticipates, close similarities and, consequently, in-
terpretative paths, between other models, ideological ap-
proaches or national policies and fascism. The prevailing 
perspective then, in the analyses of the last decade is that 
of victimizer more than victim. And this is despite the 
fact that the memorialist source is sometimes the only one 
with which to discover histories that are essential to the 
process of the Final Solution. There are aspects of the 
Holocaust about which there is no explicit documenta-
tion, but only euphemisms and, at most, memories. An 
obvious example is the history of the Sonderkommandos, 
the groups of Jews used to drag their fellow co-religion-
ists to the gas chambers, remove the bodies, burn them 
and clean out the murder facilities. The final victims re-
ferred to by Saul Friedländer (2010) in his books, after 
close on two thousand pages of highly intense reading, 
are about twenty children aged between five and twelve, 
killed after a year of medical experiments, the same day 
that Hitler was celebrating his final birthday in his Berlin 
bunker, at the same time as, outside with bombs falling 
all around, the Reich was disintegrating. No traces could 
be left, no loose ends untied, no future: at least a million 
and a half of the Tercer Reich’s Jewish victims were less 
than fourteen years old. It was this pursuit of exhaustive-
ness that enables us today to talk about genocide, an ac-
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count of which can only be constructed, for many aspects, 
through memory. 
When it comes to looking for explanations for so much 
death, on the other hand, Shoah literature reproduces the 
eliminationist drift and Judeophobic intentionality of the 
racial and anti-Semitic policies of the Nazi regime, suc-
cessfully putting to the test the framework proposed by 
Hannah Arendt (identification-exclusion-plunder-elimina-
tion) to analyze the mass killing of civilians, be they Jews 
from Eastern Europe or Armenians in Turkey. Nothing 
strange about that: after all, the extermination camps were 
no more than the final link in a chain constructed in times 
of peace, with measures, laws and acts that are openly dis-
criminatory against entire sections of the population and 
which, in times of war, served to end the lives of hundreds 
of thousands of people, as a result of territorial occupation 
practices in the East. And this is where the weightiest part 
of their argument lies: in continuity. Once again, this is not 
without its difficulties. The memory that prevails in the 
Shoah account is Jewish, even though the first inmates in 
Nazi camps, as early as 1933, were Communists and po-
litical dissidents, the occupying troops in 1941 also killed 
thousands of non-Jewish Polish, Ukrainian and Belaru-
sians, and the gas chambers were the place of the murder 
and the crematoriums the place of disappearance of hun-
dreds of thousands of Slavs and gypsies, albeit the latter 
were killed during a brief period of time. The place where 
most Jews died, in Poland, had not undergone all the po-
litical, cultural and identity developments of the Tercer 
Reich in peacetime, from the first laws of exclusion of 
1933 to the ghettoization and Kristallnacht of 1938, and 
including the racial laws of 1935. The correlation between 
Jewish persecution in Germany in peacetime and the kill-
ing of Europe Jews in Poland in wartime ultimately does 
not convince, and at times appears teleological. 
The singularization for its majority condition of a pro-
cess which was, in fact, universal, is therefore something 
of a paradox. The absolute destruction perpetrated during 
the Second World War by the National Socialist regime 
thus ceases to be interpreted in terms of “total irrationali-
ty”, “annihilation for annihilation’s sake” or “collapse of 
civilization” and comes to be observed within a brutal 
logic of racial relocation and reorganization, or “negative 
demographic policy” (Aly and Heim, 2002: 3; Aly, 1999). 
Too often seen as a process with two players, namely 
Germany and the Jews (Stone ed., 2012), this supposed 
dual relationship actually took place mainly in Poland. 
Up to half of the victims were in fact killed in their own 
place of residence. The German policy of violence spread 
across many strata of occupied society, for political and 
war reasons, such as with the partisans eliminated under 
the Nacht und Nebel program, or on racial grounds, as in 
the case of the gypsies. And when there were extermina-
tion camps, those who were gassed were Jews who were 
also Hungarian, Polish, Belarusian, Italian, Estonians and 
French. Or they were all of those things and also Com-
munists, Russians or Soviets (Snyder, 2010). 
This new historiography on Nazi violence therefore 
interprets the Second World War, and more specifically, 
the breakdown of the Eastern Front, as the necessary fa-
cilitating framework, the historical opportunity that 
would have been unimaginable for Goebbels in peace-
time, to implement what was to become the Tercer Re-
ich’s great sociopolitical project – genocide and racial re-
location in Europe (Bartov, 2008). In short, from these 
analyses, we can deduce that the genocide, the Final So-
lution, cannot be understood only from the point of arriv-
al, namely Auschwitz, but we must also take account of 
its starting point: Germany, Poland, Lithuania, the War-
saw and Lodz ghettos, Ukraine and Belarus, Paris or 
Rome: in fact, up to half of Holocaust victims were killed 
in their places of residence in mass extermination opera-
tions in which the whole community took part and from 
which many people benefitted. We can deduce too that 
the extermination camps, the death machinery for which 
the cogs were suitably oiled at the famous Wannsee con-
ference, were born of economic necessity (the difficulties 
of feeding the Germans properly, says Aly quoting 
Gelarch, encouraged the genocide of the European Jews, 
2006: 202), but they were also the result of a desire to 
find an efficient and industrial system of human elimina-
tion, rather than the more rudimentary one developed by 
the Einsatzgruppen in partnership with the local popula-
tion. We can also deduce that the genocide united and 
gave scientific, racial, economic, political and military 
coherence to the different political and ideological pro-
jects (political repression, racial biologism, anti-Semi-
tism) of National Socialism, understood as a social and 
political project and therefore of a comparable nature. 
And, in short, that the extermination was not only of 
Jews, but that there were also hundreds of thousands of 
civilians who were not killed for their Semitic condition 
(not to mention the mass killing of partisans and war pris-
oners), as well as the killing of around three million So-
viet war prisoners (in total figures, around 930,000 sur-
vived of the more than 5,700,000 detained). 
This last genocide would frequently appear to pale in 
significance beside that other great genocide, the Holo-
caust. They shared chronology and victimizer, often also 
arenas of execution, and, according to some historians, 
intentionality. But what they do not share today is the 
same debating arena regarding history and collective 
identities. Too much Holocaust kills the Holocaust, cri-
tiqued the late Tony Judt in his acceptance speech when 
awarded the Hannah Arendt Prize in 2007, suggesting 
that too much attention has been paid to the Jewish speci-
ficity and particularity of the genocide which Hebrew tra-
dition calls Shoah, perhaps leaving out millions of non-
Jewish victims caused by the German occupiers, their 
allies and satellite governments or collaborators in the 
heat of their expansion policies throughout Europe, and 
the territorial and historical contexts of their killings: 
these include the Balkans (Biondich, 2011; Korb, 2010; 
Trifkovic, 2011; Yeomans, 2013; Tomasevic, 2001), 
France (Mazower, 2008) and Italy (Klinhammer, 2006; 
Pezzino, 2007; Battini and Pezzino, 1997; Fulvetti and 
Pelini eds., 2006; Baldissara and Pezzino, 2009; Rovatti, 
2011). Both an internal conflict and, at the same time, a 
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war on the Tercer Reich’s southern-European border, the 
Italian war of 1943-45 and its debates represent a coun-
terpoint to the Judeo-centric vision of fascist violence. In 
this respect, it is not by chance that, in a climate of inter-
nal war, occupation and fascist radicalization, with three- 
or four-way slaughter and revenge (fascists, antifascists, 
Germans and allies), a phenomenon could have taken 
place like the deportation of Jews and partisans to labour 
and extermination camps in Eastern Europe (Mayda, 
2002; Matard-Bonucci, 2008). Neither in Italy nor any 
any other place in Europe were the deportations an exclu-
sively one-way phenomenon with two subjects. They 
were also internal and, even more so, intracommunity 
processes, in terms of both victims and aggressors. 
This gives us clues as to the openly vengeful nature of 
the collective violence in the post-Second World War pe-
riod: that of the groups massacred during the war, that of 
Soviet soldiers against defeated enemies or of partisans 
and guerrilla groups. Harboured within the world war 
were national wars, taking place at different paces and un-
der different criteria which, in turn, provided a framework 
for violence armed with their own criteria, and over this 
was layered the violence of the world war. The violence of 
war, projected into the time immediately after the conflict, 
sought an ejecting, homogenizing effect (Deák, Gross and 
Judt eds., 2000). Europe’s purging and defascistizing pro-
cesses, a full-scale violent political cleansing, also gener-
ated some 10,000 victims in Italy and 9,000 in France, the 
highest and most widespread rates of political detention 
ever seen in Europe (Dondi, 2004; Lottman, 1986). The de 
facto disappearance of the problem of minorities took 
place in a propitious context of extreme internal violence: 
Poland is a paradigmatic case, to the extent that it saw its 
national complexity virtually reduced to a state of homo-
geneity, with the total or partial disappearance within its 
borders of Germans (from 2.3 to 1.4% of the population), 
Ukrainians (from 13.8 to 0,7%) and Belarusians (from 5.3 
to 0.6%) (Mazower, 1998: 463). But it was by no means 
the only example: in addition to the expulsion and resettle-
ment of the Germans of Eastern Europe, between 12 and 
13 million people, other significant cases included the 
90,000 Hungarians expelled from Czechoslovakia, or the 
73,000 Slovaks ejected from Hungary (Judt, 2005). The 
expulsion of the Germans to the east of the Oder-Neisse-
Trieste line, and the national and class resettlement would, 
in any case, have caused internal conflicts of a national, 
ethnic, political and economic nature in the countries oc-
cupied by the Red Army on the western border (Cattaruz-
za, 2010). The same can be said of the so-called civil wars 
on the western borders of the Soviet Union between 1941 
and 1947 in what were the death throes of the extremely 
violent, ongoing confrontation between fascism-collabo-
rationism and communism.
In Germany, as has been documented by Giles Mac-
Donogh (2007), more than three million people died as a 
result of occupation policies. Plunder, internment in 
camps and expulsion were the mechanisms used in a de-
nazification process of which civilians were the prime tar-
get. This was punishment for the benefits the Germans 
had previously reaped from the occupation and exploita-
tion of Europe. The post-war world was therefore a time 
of readjustment, of human relocation, displacement, 
cleansing and detention – the result of the different, over-
lapping occupation and civil wars that Europe underwent. 
The presence of the Soviet army (Faraldo, 2011) in East-
ern Europe, as an invasive agent subject to a paradigmatic 
policy of violence (to the extent that it combined the vio-
lence of war, political repression and external invasion), 
also fostered the outbreak of a new era of violence in Eu-
rope, where war on its own soil ceased to be the main ve-
hicle for national construction. The end of the Second 
World War also marked the closure of the logic of civil 
war between revolution and counter-revolution: no re-
gime was defeated in Europe between 1920 and 1945 by 
a Communist or Socialist revolution. 
The last of the great European civil wars of the first 
half of the twentieth century took place on Greek soil 
and, when seen in perspective, marked a turning point 
which introduced the logic of the (so-called) Cold War 
(Gerolymatos, 2004; Voglis, 2002; Mazower ed., 1994 
and 2000; Kalyvas, 2000 and 2006). When the Greek 
Civil War ended in 1949, the whirlwind of war –either 
civil or international– would not return to European soil 
for several decades. But that end to violence can by no 
means be said to date from 1945. The end of the violence, 
if it ever really happened, would not arrive in Europe un-
til many years later, once the structural opportunities for 
the politics of violence closed: in other words, when fas-
cist dictatorships disappeared (and in Spain, the debate 
continues as from when that disappearance actually 
dates), when the possibility of the territorial occupation 
of other European countries ceased to be considered 
(bearing in mind that Western Germany was occupied un-
til 1949), and when continental wars, particularly the in-
ternal ones, stopped being a political option. 
 This is not to say, of course, that violence vanished. 
The French wars in Madagascar and Algeria, the British 
in Kenya (in which the vast majority of those who died 
were civilians), the Spanish in Ifni and the Portuguese in 
Angola, Guinea and Mozambique, all suggest that this 
whirlwind of praxes and politics of violence merely dis-
placed the eye of the storm once again to those places 
where extreme heterophobia had started up, namely the 
African continent, in the shape of new kinds of glo-
balized war which extended as far as Eastern Europe 
(Kaldor, 1999; Moore, 2010). And when it finally seemed 
as if terror was over and that History, in her painful labor 
process, had finally abandoned her blood dialectic and 
considered her journey over –having reached what Fran-
cis Fukuyama called the end of History– wars returned to 
contradict those who had said that Europe would not see 
terror within its borders again. Not, at least, of the inten-
sity attained during the Second World War, but certainly 
on a par with many of the conflicts that marked the last 
century in Europe. The widespread image of a Europe 
hijacked by terror until 1945 and redeemed from vio-
lence in the second half of the twentieth century is mis-
taken and, above all, extremely complacent. To think that 
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heterophobia and its expression through politics of vio-
lence was over proved, with hindsight, to be irresponsi-
bly naïve. 
CONCLUSION
The superimposition of wars and internal conflicts 
made Europe a fragmented, dark, bloody and savage con-
tinent. The civil wars between 1918 and 1947 and the 
world wars between 1914-18 and 1939-45 were, in fact, 
wars comprising superimposed processes, a phenomenon 
which always gives rise to conflicts of great violent inten-
sity towards non-combatants. This also explains why the 
reprisals and violence extended beyond the end of the 
armed conflicts themselves. It is therefore reasonable to 
think of the twentieth century as the most violent in Euro-
pean history. It was the most violent because after the end 
of a war –which its contemporaries referred to as Great 
War and World War because they knew of no other exam-
ples of comparable dimensions– states and their use of 
violence rose in a cumulative crescendo which concluded 
with the greatest collective annihilation ever registered in 
such a short space of time. The Second World War (with 
between 35 and 40 million deaths) then went on to far 
outstrip its older sister. It was the most violent century 
because this succession of events was accompanied by 
another, no less bloody and foundational, series of civil 
wars and internal conflicts. It was the most violent centu-
ry because, despite everything that had happened prior to 
1945, the most summary of proceedings, mass execu-
tions, dictatorships implemented and maintained through 
civilian bloodshed were all pursued and even perfected in 
Europe: in no small number of cases continuing with the 
dynamics established in the first half of the century; in 
others, with new dynamics; and, in the case of Greece, 
serving as a link between the two. 
Unlike many of the works devoted to the interpreta-
tion of the mechanisms of contemporary collective vio-
lence (and in particular to the concept of genocide), I do 
not consider it useful to highlight one, or the, “correct” 
way of interpreting or naming that past. There are often 
attempts to provide elements of analysis that lead to a 
unique definition or conceptualization, merging complex, 
and often distant, violent processes in omni-comprehen-
sive narratives and interpretations. Faced with the (possi-
bly vain) hope for predictability and the generalized de-
contextualization of analyses of violence which have 
been made in many areas of political science, but are par-
ticularly obvious in the study of civil wars (see Newman, 
2014 and Collier and Sambanis eds., 2005), current histo-
riographical analyses on collective European violence 
have started to reach a significant degree of sophistica-
tion, claiming ownership of a comparative perspective 
that requires extensive linguistic, theoretical and historio-
graphical knowledge. To cater for this need for historical 
contingency without renouncing theoretical complexity, I 
have proposed the term politics of violence by way of 
conceptual umbrella. Without wishing to open a Byzan-
tine debate focusing on issues of terminology, I feel that 
the name politics of violence better encompasses, with 
fewer assumptions and more nuances, what we are ana-
lyzing here: the mechanisms, the politics which, at the 
theoretical and practical levels, different states, state 
agencies or groups used to access, control, monopolize 
and influence power through violence. It therefore im-
plies the existence of specific political practices whose 
theoretical content and practical materialization occurred 
through violence. Of course, here too, we need to specify 
what is meant by politics and what is meant by violence. 
In reality, this is perhaps one of the most complex debates 
on the contemporary age.
The last two decades have been universally devoted to 
the era of the victim of violence and to the victim as an 
absolute category. However, for the purposes of under-
standing collective violence, it is more enlightening to 
explore the motivations of the perpetrators. And it is this 
comparison that is so difficult to tackle. Perhaps the first 
thing to do is to identify this perpetrator, and ask our-
selves to what extent the things we take for granted are 
merely half-truths, widely accepted in view of the diffi-
culty of knowing more thoroughly the situations that lead 
to collective violence. To achieve this, context is essen-
tial, but it is not everything. And, on their own, they cer-
tainly do not answer the most complex question we 
should ask about the processes of mass violence in twen-
tieth-century Europe, namely “Why?”. The death of an-
other individual is, undoubtedly, one of the most radical 
and far-reaching decisions another human being can 
make. It entails crossing, or having previously already 
crossed, thresholds of such extreme dis-empathy towards 
the other that, for the most part, historiography has not 
–we have not– even began to glimpse them. Rather than 
the reassuring and widespread tendency of de-personaliz-
ing violence a posteriori by explaining it on grounds of 
context, the received order and collective guilt or by re-
ducing it to barbarism, destruction, madness and futility, 
there are much more complex and, if we wish, disturbing 
answers. Exploring the whys and wherefores of this vio-
lence implies immersion in ideological, identity, cultural, 
political and economic plots in local, regional, suprare-
gional, national and supranational contexts. Beside these 
contexts stand decisions and intentions, also in the use of 
force, killing, exploitation, deportation or repression. And 
this is where the visions of violence based on projection 
(the omnipresently destructive master plan or due obedi-
ence), moral conventions (evil for evil’s sake, absolute 
destruction) or pathological archetypes (madness, ill-
ness), fail. The problem resides in offering an alternative 
interpretative mechanism.
Observing violent processes and analyzing them as a 
whole, approaching them from their multifactual praxes, 
through the languages that cloaked them and the interpre-
tations (mainly positive) developed around them, is key 
to placing them in context and to understanding the his-
toric and interpretative relationship that can be estab-
lished between them. We have to demonstrate the differ-
ences and the continuities, to understand how and why 
they start, how and why they develop and how and why 
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they end. We have, in short, to understand the mecha-
nisms and the intellectual and identity logic represented 
and which gain shape, meaning and historical praxis in 
the act of identification and collective violence. Twenti-
eth-century collective violence did not, in most cases, 
pursue destruction as ultimate goal, but was seen as a 
means to achieving a “higher” purpose: to cleanse the 
soil, the country, the community and its subjectivities 
(Das, 2007; Das et.al. eds., 2000), by what was seen as 
the necessary, healing and proactive elimination of the 
enemy. This does not, of course, mean that all collective 
violence in twentieth-century Europe had an elaborate, 
positively-projected objective, be it the improvement of 
race or society, or the protection of a threatened national 
community. The violence of the post-Second World War 
period –that of the groups massacred during the war, that 
of the Soviet soldiers against the defeated enemies or that 
of partisans and guerrillas– often reveals an openly 
vengeful nature. This complacent and benevolent view of 
violence –as necessary, healing and proactive– was not 
the exclusive preserve of any country or historical pro-
cess. But it was always a performative process.
However, none of this can lead us to conclusions 
about the predictability of the future. As we are reminded 
by Weiss-Wendt (2008: 63), the Darfur massacres took 
place at the moment of greatest development of genocide 
studies. Knowing about Auschwitz did not deliver hu-
manity from the mass killings of Cambodia or Yugosla-
via. Moreover, if ethnic cleansing in the Balkans was not 
enough to refute the aim of endowing analysis of the past 
with preventative validity, we should perhaps consider 
that, while social sciences were discussing the return of 
violence and the scientific nature of genocide and its un-
repeatability (because, it was said, nobody would ever 
again permit the building of gas chambers and crematori-
ums in the context of humanitarian interventionism), sev-
eral thousand Hutus were proving to the world, on live 
television, that no eichmanns or Wannsee conferences 
were necessary to devise a genocide. Decades of identifi-
cation and stereotyping, years of heterophobia and a pro-
pitious context would suffice so that, where there were 
first pistols and then science, gas chambers and cremato-
riums, there could now to be machetes and clubs. 
NOTES
1  Javier Rodrigo is Ramón y Cajal research fellow assigned to the 
project “Las alternativas a la quiebra liberal en Europa: socialis-
mo, democracia, fascismo y populismo (1914-1991)” (HAR2011-
25749) [The alternatives to liberal collapse in Europe: socialism, 
democracy, fascism and populism] at the Universitat Autònoma 
de Barcelona. This article contains some of the ideas expressed 
by Javier Rodrigo (ed.) in Políticas de la violencia. Europa siglo 
XX, Zaragoza, Prensas de la Universidad de Zaragoza, 2014.
2 The title of this work refers to the adjectives used in the titles of 
the highly influential books by Mazower (1998), Snyder (2010) 
and Lowe (2012).
3 Works showing historiography’s sensitivity to the category of 
genocide, its conceptual growth and limitations include those by 
Gellatelly and Kiernan eds. (2003); Bruneteau (2006); Bartov, 
Grossmann and Nolan eds. (2002); Totten and Parsons (2009); 
Sémelin (2007).
4 During the Fascist ventennio colonial internment camps existed 
in Libya and Somalia, and civil internment camps on the Italian 
peninsula. In the Libyan camps, according to Angelo del Boca 
(1988), some 40,000 people died from starvation, illness and sub-
jection to forced labor. On the Somalian camps, see Labanca 
(2001), and others.
5 On violence in the First World War, see Kramer’s seminal work 
(2007). Also Becker, Audoin-Rouzeau, Ingrao and Rousso eds. 
(2002); Becker and Audoin-Rouzeau (2000).
6 On Russia, see Mayer (2001); Brovkin (1994); Figes (2000: 609 
and following). On Finland, Alapuro (1988); Upton (1980). 
Benchmark works on the war in Finland, by Manninen, Paavol-
ainen and Ylikangas, are quoted by Alapuro (2002).
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